Cell 3ciii · GWG Proposal
Treat Corruption of Delegated Public Power as Serious Public Corruption
GREEN WHITE GO MANIFESTO — 2026.10.01 · CANONICAL THREE-SENTENCE UNIT
Delegating a public function does not privatise the integrity obligations attached to it, and government remains answerable to citizens when wrongdoing occurs in the delivery of that function.
Existing anti-corruption and criminal law continues to apply where it is already sufficient, while genuine gaps created by delegated public power should be closed by law; offence analysis, compliance systems, reporting, investigations, sanctions and conflict-of-interest controls belong in the Integrity Policy Paper and legislation.
The purpose is to ensure that delegation never becomes an escape from public accountability, without creating another standalone anti-corruption agency, reviving a recovery-first programme or claiming that the system can be made corruption-proof.
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Available · v0.2 · 2026-10-01
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The purpose is to ensure that delegation never becomes an escape from public accountability, without creating another standalone anti-corruption agency, reviving a recovery-first programme or claiming that the system can be made corruption-proof.
Evidence and limits
The delegation doctrine is a GWG choice. Claims about efficiency, savings or complete legal coverage require function-specific evidence; provider delegation does not remove public accountability.
The proposal remains distinct from current law and from evidence for individual components.
Evidence notes for this pillarRelated Hard Questions
Because Green White Go prefers one clearly accountable owner for serious federal enforcement rather than several institutions able to pass responsibility among themselves. Under the destination architecture, serious federal anti-corruption enforcement sits inside the Federal Police. Concentrating enforcement creates risks and requires stronger checks.
The safeguards include:
- specialised functions separated internally;
- blind or protected case allocation where appropriate;
- scrutiny of officers' own finances;
- judicial safeguards around intrusive financial-intelligence powers;
- public spending information visible independently of police;
- the Federal Attorney-General selected through the civilian legal-accountability chain;
- legislative scrutiny of Federal Police leadership;
- independent courts;
- open audit and public-information systems.
Police visibility into public spending never means police approval of public expenditure. And Green White Go does not claim that placing anti-corruption in the Federal Police somehow makes corruption impossible.
The proposition is narrower:
make responsibility clear, then surround concentrated power with visible checks.
No. It means separating public authority from delivery. Some acts must remain public because only the state may lawfully exercise them. Other work may be performed by accredited, contracted or competing providers where law permits and risk allows.
The governing questions are:
What is the legally operative act? Who is allowed to make that decision? Who remains accountable? Who hears the appeal?
Who replaces failure?
Green White Go therefore distinguishes:
- non-delegable sovereign decisions;
- delegable execution;
- statutory accredited certification;
- ordinary market procurement.
The state keeps the sovereign decision, rule-setting, public review and continuity responsibility. Provider competition is allowed only where those boundaries make it safe.
Delegate the transaction. Never delegate accountability.
Delegation must not create an integrity-law loophole. Existing offences apply where they already cover the conduct; specific legal gaps require legislation. Records, audit access, ownership disclosure, conflict rules and public review follow delegated public power. The proposal does not assume every provider employee automatically becomes a constitutional public officer.